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FROM REHNQUIST TO ROBERTS: HAS
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY LOST A
FRIEND AND GAINED A FOE?
SUSAN M. GILLES*
Each one of us desires to keep our personal information private: to
lead what Chief Justice Rehnquist once called a "private life." Though
Rehnquist has been labeled as an enemy of privacy, throughout his years on
the bench, he was a consistent supporter of informational privacy. He
punished those who published private information and blocked those who
sought access to private records. Today, as threats to privacy increase,
informational privacy needs a new champion on the Court. Many presume
that Chief Justice Roberts will step into the shoes of his predecessor and
mentor Chief Justice Rehnquist. But, while the record is incomplete, the
signs are ominous. Chief Justice Roberts has shown little concern for
informational privacy and may undo, not expand, Rehnquist's legacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts was
repeatedly asked about his views on the "right to privacy" and how they
compared to those of his predecessor and mentor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist.' The members of the Judiciary Committee appeared to
assume, as have commentators,2 that Roberts's views on privacy will
mirror those of Rehnquist. This assumption may be justified with
regard to Roe v. Wade.3 But the scope of privacy law extends well
beyond abortion rights, and yet, not one senator asked Roberts about
his willingness to protect private information. This may have been a
crucial omission, for the issue of informational privacy is likely to come
before the Court with increasing frequency during Roberts's tenure. If
the senators had asked, they would have discovered that while Chief
Justice Rehnquist was a friend to informational privacy, Chief Justice
Roberts may well be a foe.
This Article demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
Chief Justice Rehnquist prized some aspects of privacy.4 The accepted
canon is that Rehnquist was a staunch foe of privacy, once earning him
the score of "100% conservative in privacy cases."5  It is true that
1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/shlO9-158/browse.html
[hereinafter Hearing].
2. See infra note 11.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This assumption seems born out by Roberts's vote in Gonzales
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003).
4. This Article illustrates that Rehnquist's judicial decisions consistently favored
informational privacy. Rehnquist also prized privacy in his personal life: in an interview in
May 2004, Rehnquist commented that one of the "most appealing things" about serving as a
Justice was that "it enables you to participate in some way and to some extent in the way the
country is governed, but you're able to maintain a private life as well." Tony Mauro, The
Chief and Us: Chief Justice William Rehnquist, The News Media, and the Need for Dialogue
Between Judges and Journalists, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 407, 417 (2006) (reporting a May 2004
C-SPAN2 interview with Rehnquist).
5. Scott P. Johnson & Robert M. Alexander, The Rehnquist Court and the Devolution of
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Rehnquist's notion of privacy did not embrace any right to an abortion,6
to consensual sexual activity, 7 or to assisted suicide." Equally, Rehnquist
extended little protection to expectations of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.9
This Article does not dispute that Rehnquist was a vocal opponent
of many important privacy claims. But focusing on his opposition to a
general right of privacy' ° has led scholars to overlook his support of an
increasingly important form of privacy-informational privacy. This
Article sets the record straight: Rehnquist was a strong proponent of a
right to informational privacy.
In contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist's long record on the Court,
relatively little is known about Chief Justice Roberts's views on this
aspect of privacy law. However, the signs for informational privacy are
ominous. As discussed in the final section of this Article, the record so
far indicates that the new Chief Justice will not be an advocate for
informational privacy and indeed may well undo Rehnquist's legacy in
this area."
the Right to Privacy, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 621, 645 (2003).
6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 171-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also Dawn Johnsen, Abortion: A Mixed and Unsettled Legacy, in THE
REHNQUIST LEGACY 301, 310, 318 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006).
7. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578 (2003); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
9. As one scholar put it, Rehnquist's "consistent rejection of claims of individual rights
over more than thirty-three years shows much narrower concern for the property and privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment than has been exhibited by the sixteen other
Justices with whom he has shared the Supreme Court bench." Craig M. Bradley, The Fourth
Amendment: Be Reasonable, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 81, 93-94 (Craig M. Bradley ed.,
2006).
10. Rehnquist strenuously opposed the recognition of a general right of privacy: in a
1974 law review article, Rehnquist denounced the tendency to "lump[] under the umbrella of
'privacy"' "widely divergent claims, which upon analysis have very little in common with one
another." William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and
Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come A Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1974).
11. A few online commentators addressed Chief Justice Roberts's views on the privacy
of information at the time of his nomination. See, e.g., Letter from Electronic Privacy
Information Center 2 (Sept. 9, 2005), http://epicwest.org/privacy/justices/roberts/0905
letter.pdf (urging the Senators to explore Roberts's views on privacy and expressing
"concern" about his willingness to protect privacy); Posting of Randy Gainer to Privacy and
Security Law Blog, http://privsecblog.com/archives/personal-privacy-judge-roberts-views-on-
government-searches-privacy-of-records-issues-are-unknown.html (Sept. 16, 2005) (criticizing
the lack of attention paid to Roberts's philosophy on issues of privacy of information).
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II. REHNQUIST: AN ADVOCATE FOR INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
"Informational privacy" was not a term that Rehnquist used. 2
Rather, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,3 he described a right to hold "private
conversation[s] '14 and to control information about ourselves. 5 For
Rehnquist, "some of the most egregious violations of privacy" occur
when we cannot prevent "access to our personal and business e-mails,
our medical and financial records, or our cordless and cellular telephone
conversations."
6
"Informational privacy" is thus shorthand for each individual's
ability to keep information about himself private-to lead, as Rehnquist
once put it, a "private life."" The law can enhance such privacy in two
ways: it can punish people who reveal the information (by imposing
post-publication penalties), and it can try to safeguard the information
in the first place (by denying access). Rehnquist consistently voted to
do both. Moreover, he did so whether the offender was the press or the
government. Section A discusses his record of protecting privacy by
punishing the publication of private information, and Section B
addresses his record of denying access. Section C offers an overarching
assessment of Rehnquist's dedication to privacy.
A. Championing Privacy by Punishing Publication
1. Punishing the Press When It Publishes Private Facts
a. Advocating for Privacy in "Private Fact" Cases
In the Rehnquist era, the Court heard five cases addressing the
press's publication of true private information, and in each one the
majority sided with the press on First Amendment grounds. 8 While the
12. The term is suggested by the Court's language in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
The majority recognized an "interest in the nondisclosure of private information." Id. at 600.
13. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
14. Id. at 555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 541-42.
16. Id. at 541.
17. Mauro, supra note 4, at 417.
18. The five cases, listed in the order they reached the Court, are Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524 (1989); and Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). Intermittently, the Court has
included a sixth case, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), as
part of this series. Some of the cases concerned statutes that criminalized the publication of
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majority never adopted the absolutist position urged by the press 9 the
test it fashioned, the Daily Mail test, precludes recovery in the absence
of "a state interest of the highest order., 20 In case after case, despite
seemingly compelling privacy interests-for instance, a rape victim's
right to not be named by the media,21 or the right to a private telephone
conversation22-the majority never found that privacy outweighed
speech interests.23
In stark contrast, Rehnquist repeatedly valued privacy over speech.24
Admittedly, in Oklahoma Publishing Co., the first privacy case he faced
after joining the Court, Rehnquist voted for the press and against the
state's efforts to protect the name of an accused juvenile.25 But, as the
Court's per curiam opinion noted, the state was seeking to punish a
newspaper for publishing information that the state itself had already
released in open court.26 The state's actions seemed designed to censor
the press, not to safeguard the juvenile's privacy.
Two years later, in Daily Mail, Rehnquist started to part company
private information. See, e.g., Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 98. Others concerned tort actions for
the publication of private facts based on common law or statute. See, e.g., Fla. Star, 491 U.S.
at 526; Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 471-72.
19. The press, citing to the First Amendment, has repeatedly argued that it "may never
be punished, civilly or criminally, for publishing the truth." Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 531; see also
Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 489.
20. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
21. See, e.g., Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526; Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496-97.
22. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517.
23. Id. at 535; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526, 541; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105-06; Okla. Publ'g
Co., 430 U.S. at 310; Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496-97.
24. Rehnquist voted with the majority, immunizing the press from liability, in two of the
cases, Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment), and Oklahoma
Publishing Co., 430 U.S. 308. He dissented, arguing for greater protection of privacy in two
cases, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), and Florida Star, 491 U.S. at
542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He disposed of the fifth case on jurisdictional grounds. Cox
Broad., 420 U.S. at 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. Okla. Publ'g Co., 430 U.S. at 311-12.
26. Id. at 310. An eleven-year-old boy was charged with murder and his name revealed
in open court. Id. at 309. After several stories appeared identifying the boy, the trial court
enjoined subsequent publication of the boy's name. Id. at 308-09.
27. See id. at 310. The Court viewed the case as a relatively simple application of its
prior restraint doctrine: "the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court
to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings
which were in fact open to the public." Id. Later, in Bartnicki, Rehnquist argued that the
Daily Mail test should always be limited to cases where the government itself released the
information, the information was already available to the public, and there was a
demonstrated risk of press censorship. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
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with the Court's majority, writing a concurrence that revealed his
commitment to privacy and his growing discomfort with the trend of the
Court's rulings. 8 In Daily Mail, two newspapers were indicted for
including the name of the juvenile gunman as part of their coverage of a
school shooting.29 The majority, creating what would later become
known as the Daily Mail test, struck down the statute, finding the State's
interest in protecting juvenile offenders insufficient to justify the limits
on free speech) 0
Rehnquist's concurrence accused the majority of overvaluing the
speech interest and undervaluing the privacy interest at stake:
In my view, a State's interest in preserving the anonymity
of its juvenile offenders-an interest that I consider to
be, in the words of the Court, of the "highest order"-far
outweighs any minimal interference with freedom of the
press that a ban on publication of the youths' names
entails.3'
Rehnquist only concurred in the majority's finding that the statute was
unconstitutional because, as written, the statute applied solely to
newspapers and left radio and television free to publish the juvenile's
name. 2 Rehnquist made clear that he would uphold a revised statute
because, for him, privacy outweighed any asserted First Amendment
right.33
Rehnquist's reluctant concurrence in Daily Mail had, by 1989,
28. 443 U.S. at 106-10 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
29. Id. at 99-100 (majority opinion). The newspapers learned the name of the fourteen-
year-old shooter from witnesses and police on the scene. Id. at 99.
30. Id. at 103-04. The test provides that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order." Id. at 103.
31. Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). Rehnquist reiterated his general
view that the First Amendment did not guarantee "the right to speak on any subject at any
time," but rather required a "careful[] weigh[ing of] the conflicting interests to determine
which demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented." Id. at
106. He argued that the State had a strong interest in rehabilitating young people by
protecting them from the stigma of early misconduct. Id. at 107-08. Moreover, it was "only a
minimal interference with freedom of the press" to preclude the publishing of a juvenile's
name. Id. at 108.
32. Id. at 110.
33. Id. ("[A] generally effective ban on publication that applied to all forms of mass
communication, electronic and print media alike, would be constitutional.").
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become a dissent?' In Florida Star, the police erroneously posted, and a
newspaper then published, the name of a rape victim in violation of a
Florida statute that made it unlawful to report the name of a victim of a
sexual offense.35 The majority again held the victim's claim was barred
by the First Amendment.36 Although the majority cautioned that it was
not holding that there was "no zone of personal privacy within which the
State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press,"37 for
Justice White in dissent-a dissent Rehnquist joined-the Florida Star
decision rang the death knell of any effective protection for private
facts:38 "If the First Amendment prohibits wholly private persons (such
as B.J.F.) from recovering for the publication of the fact that she was
raped, I doubt that there remain any 'private facts' which persons may
assume will not be published in the newspapers or broadcast on
television.""
Rehnquist's desire to protect informational privacy was evident
again in his dissent in the Court's most recent privacy case, Bartnicki.°
The majority again applied the Daily Mail test to strike down another
statute designed to protect privacy, this time the Federal Wiretap Act's
prohibition of the disclosure of an illegally recorded telephone
conversation.1 In dissent, Rehnquist argued that the Daily Mail test
should not be expanded to immunize the press from replaying a private
telephone conversation.4 '2 He sought to limit the precedential power of
Daily Mail, arguing that it applied only when the information was
34. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (White, J., dissenting, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined).
35. Id. at 526 n.1, 527-28 (majority opinion).
36. Id. at 526. Applying the Daily Mail test, the majority acknowledged that "the
privacy of victims of sexual offenses" was a "highly significant" interest but struck down the
statute as flawed because it lacked a fault requirement and sought to punish the press for
information released by the government itself. Id. at 537-41.
37. Id. at 541.
38. Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (commenting that the decision "inevitably"
"obliterate[s] ... the tort of the publication of private facts").
39. Id. at 550-51. For the dissent, the Court was correct to balance free speech and
privacy interests, but it accorded "too little weight" to privacy and "too much" weight to free
speech. Id. at 551. Thus, the dissent would strike a pro-privacy balance and "draw the line
higher on the hillside: a spot high enough to protect B.J.F.'s desire for privacy and peace-of-
mind in the wake of a horrible personal tragedy." Id. at 553.
40. 532 U.S. 514, 541-56 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In Bartnicki, two union
leaders sued a radio station when it played an illegally recorded tape of their cell phone
conversation. Id. at 518-19 (majority opinion).
41, Id. at 517-18. The Court also struck down a parallel state statute. Id. at 520 n.3, 535.
42. Id. at 545-49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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already "publicly available, 43 had been released by the "government
itself,"" and there was danger of government suppression. In contrast,
in Bartnicki, Rehnquist argued, the state was protecting, not
undermining, the privacy of its citizens by making wire-tapping illegal.
46
Finding Daily Mail inapplicable, and applying only intermediate
scrutiny, Rehnquist would have upheld the statute because of the state's
interest in both deterring those who tape calls and protecting the privacy
of millions of cellular telephone users.4 ' For Rehnquist, privacy was a
"venerable right," 8  and "[i]n a democratic society privacy of
communication is essential if citizens are to think and act creatively and
constructively., 49 Rehnquist argued that with the growing technology of
intrusion, unless the government was left free to enact laws protecting
privacy, the confidentiality of our emails, our personal records, and even
our telephone conversations would be lost.'° Rehnquist would protect
the right to have "private conversation[s]"51 over any claimed First
Amendment right to debate matters of public concern. 2
These cases reveal that Rehnquist was an ardent advocate for
privacy, an advocate whose voice grew stronger with each case he
considered.53  While his earliest decision showed that Rehnquist was
43. Id. at 546 (citation omitted).
44. Id. Rehnquist acknowledged that in Daily Mail itself, the press received the
information from witnesses and not the government; however, Rehnquist still argued that the
Daily Mail test should be limited to cases where the state is the source of the information. Id.
at 546 n.3.
45. Id. at 547.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 548-49.
48. Id. at 553.
49. Id. at 543 (quoting President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, in THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202 (1967)).
50. See id. at 541-42.
51. Id. at 555.
52. Rehnquist's dissent in Bartnicki, also, as we have seen before, devalued the speech at
issue. Id. at 556. There was only a "marginal claim" to free speech, id., and indeed, there was
a First Amendment right to keep speech private, id. at 553-55.
53. Of the four cases that he decided on the merits, in the first, Oklahoma Publishing
Co., in 1977, Rehnquist joined the per curiam decision and voted to protect the press's right
to publish. 430 U.S. 308, 308-09 (1977). By 1979, in Daily Mail, he still voted in favor of the
press, but only because of a flaw in the statute, and wrote a separate concurrence expressly
emphasizing that privacy is an interest of the highest order. 443 U.S. 97, 106-10 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Then in Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524, 542-53 (1989)
(White, J., dissenting), and Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting),
decided decades later, he wrote or joined dissents that sought even greater protection of
privacy. Thus, his voting pattern may reflect a growing recognition of the importance of
privacy.
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unsympathetic to privacy claims where the state had affirmatively
released the information to the public (such cases involved little
"privacy" and the state's action bore all the hallmarks of governmental
suppression)," Rehnquist zealously supported the state when it
genuinely sought to protect privacy.5 In his eyes, the majority's rulings
in Daily Mail, Florida Star, and Bartnicki were erroneous: by striking
down statutes that attempted to keep facts private, the decisions
severely hampered the states' ability to ensure that private information
remained confidential . For Rehnquist, the need to effectively protect
private facts easily outweighed any free speech concerns.
b. Using Libel Law to Deter the Press from Reporting
on Private Figures and Private Facts
The libel cases repeat the same theme: Rehnquist actively protected
privacy and routinely rejected First Amendment claims. Ostensibly,
libel cases do not concern privacy, but rather harm to reputation. 7
However, libel is tied to privacy in a very practical way: if the press is
deterred from reporting on private individuals or private facts for fear of
libel, the result is less press coverage and more privacy. By making the
press leery of reporting any facts, true or false, about private persons,
Rehnquist used the libel cases to create powerful protections for
privacy.
When Rehnquist joined the Court, the epic decision of New York
Times v. Sullivan59 was settled law. Sullivan, which applied the First
54. Okla. Publ'g Co., 430 U.S. at 310-11. This is consistent with Rehnquist's argument
in Bartnicki that the Daily Mail principle should be limited to cases where there was a risk of
press censorship. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
55. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541-42 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 547
(White, J., dissenting); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 109-10 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). As Justice
Rehnquist put it in his concurrence in Daily Mail, "in this case the State took every step that
was in its power to protect the juvenile's name." Id. at 109 n.2.
56. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541-42 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 547
(White, J., dissenting); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 109-10 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In his
concurrence in Daily Mail, Rehnquist pointed out that unless the states were given the power
to punish publications, they could not effectively ensure that information remained private.
443 U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
57. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 400, at 1117 (2000).
58. Privacy and reputation have also been linked by the Court on a theoretical level.
The Court often describes "reputation" as part of an individual's "private personality." See,
e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 781 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-58 (1985) (opinion of
Powell, J.); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92-94 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
59. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Amendment to libel actions, required public officials to prove falsity
and a high degree of fault ("actual malice") when they sued the press for
libel.' However, the scope of that decision, in particular what kind of
libel suits the actual malice standard applied to, was the subject of
intense debate and division on the Court.6' A plurality opinion authored
by Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. had rejected the
idea that private persons should be exempt from the exacting actual
malice standard: any plaintiff, "famous or anonymous," must prove
61
actual malice to recover.
Thus, when Rehnquist arrived, private figures received no special
treatment. Within a decade, Rehnquist had transformed the law: while
the public official and all-purpose-public-figure doctrines remained
largely untouched,63 a new private figure doctrine had emerged. First,
Rehnquist's vote in Gertz 6 helped form a new majority, which rejected
Rosenbloom and announced that when private figures sued for libel,
they were exempt from the strict proof requirements of Sullivan.65
Then, in a series of rulings in the 1970s, Rehnquist subtly moved the
dividing line between public and private figures, so that more and more
plaintiffs were classified as private.66 Many apparently "public" people
now qualified as private figures. 67  For instance, in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, Rehnquist argued that Mary Alice Firestone, a wealthy Palm
Beach socialite, whose divorce was such a cause c~lbre that she made
frequent press appearances and retained a clipping service, remained a
60. Id. at 283.
61. For a discussion of this division on the Court, see Susan M. Gilles, From Baseball
Parks to the Public Arena: Assumption of the Risk in Tort Law and Constitutional Libel Law,
75 TEMP. L. REV. 231, 239-42 (2002).
62. 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality decision), abrogated by Gertz, 418 U.S.
323.
63. In fact, Rehnquist expanded the protection afforded to the press when they reported
on public figures. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
64. 418 U.S. at 324.
65. Id. at 346-47. Rather than proof of actual malice, the Gertz Court held that private
plaintiffs need only prove some level of fault, such as negligence. Id. This was a significant
shift because, while the actual malice standard is almost impossible for plaintiffs to prove,
negligence does not pose such an insurmountable barrier to recovery. See Susan M. Gilles,
Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1774-79 (1998).
66. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
67. See Wolston. 443 U.S. at 161: Hutchinson. 443 U.S. at 135-36: Time. Inc.. 424 U.S. at
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private figure.68 Rehnquist helped create the concept of private figures
in Gertz and then drastically expanded that concept in the decade that
followed.69
Finally, in a third step, Rehnquist helped create the private facts
doctrine, which stripped almost all First Amendment protection from
reports on private matters.70  Rehnquist joined the plurality in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., holding that where a private
person sued about a report on a private matter, the press received almost
no constitutional protection. 7' The plurality explained that where the
matter was simply one of private concern, any First Amendment interest
was easily outweighed by the state's strong interest in protecting
individual dignity.
72
The net effect of these rulings is not simply to expose the press to
greater liability, but also to deter the press from reporting on private
individuals. The more the press is deterred from reporting about private
persons, the greater the informational privacy those people enjoy.
c. Added Inducements
One clarification is in order: it is likely that Rehnquist's record in the
privacy and libel cases was due to both a desire to protect privacy and a
general antipathy to First Amendment claims. Rehnquist was an
unfailing opponent of free speech claims.73 Thus, even if Rehnquist did
68. Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 454-55. Three years later in Wolston, Rehnquist again
adopted a broad reading of "private figure" to conclude that the plaintiff, the nephew of a
Russian spy subpoenaed to testify about his uncle, was a private person. 443 U.S. at 161-62.
69. Rehnquist has also voted to minimize the constitutional protections for speech about
private persons involved in matters of public concern. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 790 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting, in which Justice Rehnquist
joined).
70. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985).
71. Id. at 760-61, 763. While the Court conceded that speech about the private matters
of private persons was "not totally unprotected by the First Amendment," it held that such a
plaintiff could recover presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice, and
hinted that such speech might not merit any of the other constitutional safeguards crafted in
Gertz and New York Times. Id.
72. Id. at 757-58.
73. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Hustler: Justice Rehnquist and "The Freedom of Speech, or
of the Press," in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 11, 13 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006). Stone's
comprehensive review of First Amendment decisions led him to conclude that "[d]uring the
course of his tenure, Justice Rehnquist has been, by an impressive margin, the member of the
Supreme Court least likely to invalidate a law as violating 'the freedom of speech, or of the
press."' Id. at 13; see also SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 70
(1989) (discussing Rehnquist's First Amendment record as an Associate Justice and
concluding that Rehnquist was "the [J]ustice who was least supportive of First Amendment
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not support privacy, the low value Rehnquist placed on speech made it
likely that the press would lose these cases.74 Equally, as a strong
supporter of states' rights, his votes undoubtedly reflected his belief that
democratically elected governments should be free to legislate on issues
of public policy.
75
However, Rehnquist's position in the private fact and libel cases is
best explained only if we credit his love of privacy, along with his
antipathy to free speech and his distaste for judicial encroachment on
local democratic power. In the libel area, while Rehnquist gutted the
protection offered to reports on private persons and private facts, he left
untouched, and indeed arguably extended, the protection offered to the
press when it reported on public officials and all-purpose-public
figures.76 Rehnquist's one pro-press decision, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell,77 has left commentators bemused, driven to explain the decision
as an "easy case" or a reflection of Rehnquist's sense of humor or
boyish love of cartoons.7 ' Hustler concerned an admitted all-purpose-
public figure, nationally known televangelist and political activist Jerry
Falwell,79 and a cartoon that contained parody, not "actual facts." Such
claims"); Burt Neuborne, Free Expression and the Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST
COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 15, 16 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (reviewing Rehnquist's
record in free speech cases and concluding that he was hostile to free speech claims, but failed
to persuade a majority of his colleagues to join his position). Rehnquist opposed press claims
in several areas of the law: in libel cases; in access to court cases, see infra Part II.B.1 , and in
procedural protection cases, see, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The only notable
exception, Rehnquist's pro-press opinion in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), is
discussed below.
74. In the private fact cases, Rehnquist expressly devalued the speech interest at stake.
See supra notes 31, 39, 52; Stone, supra note 73, at 13-16 (demonstrating that Rehnquist
consistently opposed First Amendment rights in diverse areas).
75. Richard W. Garnett, Less Is More: Justice Rehnquist, the Freedom of Speech, and
Democracy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 26, 42 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006) (arguing that
Rehnquist's reluctance to expand First Amendment freedom was driven by a desire to avoid
increasing the range of policy questions subject to judicial scrutiny: "[A]s the civic, social and
political territory controlled by the Free Speech Clause grows, the amount shrinks that is
governed democratically and experimentally by the people and their representatives .... ");
see also DAVIS, supra note 73, at 93 (concluding Rehnquist's commitment to state legislative
power was so strong that "when it is the state that regulates speech, the First Amendment
speaks with a voice so faint that Rehnquist fails to hear it").
76. Rehnquist expanded the press protection for reporting on all-purpose-public figures
and public officials when he held in Hustler Magazine, Inc v. Falwell that even when such
public plaintiffs sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress, they had to meet the
actual malice standard. 485 U.S. at 56.
77. Id.
78. Stone, supra note 73, at 23-24 (discussing Rehnquist's position in Hustler).
79. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57 n.5.
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political cartoons raise none of the privacy issues present when the press
publishes true facts about private persons. Perhaps, while Rehnquist
was no friend to the press, he was its worst enemy only when privacy
was threatened.
2. Punishing the Government When It Publishes Private Facts
Additional evidence of Rehnquist's support for informational
privacy comes in a pair of cases that recognized a constitutional right to
the nondisclosure of private information enforceable against the
government. In Whalen v. Roe, patients and doctors challenged a state
statute that, in an effort to limit the misuse of certain drugs, required
copies of prescriptions to be filed with the state, which then created a
computerized database."1 The Court unanimously upheld the statute,
noting that doctors had always provided this type of information to the
state and that the state had adopted extensive safeguards that prevented
release of the data.8
The Court's solicitude for informational privacy is notable. The
Court unanimously presumed that privacy covers not only the right to
make "certain kinds of important decisions" (the Roe v. Wade line of
decisions), but also an "individual interest in avoiding [state] disclosure
of personal matters." 3 The Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
privacy included a right to the "nondisclosure of private information.
81
Applying this right to the state's creation of a drug use database, the
Court found that the mere gathering of data, if accompanied by
sufficient safeguards, was not unconstitutional.8" However, the Court
expressed concern about "the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized
data banks or other massive governmental files." 6 The Court suggested
that either proof of disclosure of private data or of a "system that did
not contain comparable security provisions" would raise grave
constitutional concerns.87
We would expect Rehnquist to have had two objections to such a
80. Id at 50.
81. 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977).
82. Id. at 600-04.
83. Id. at 599-600.
84. Id. at 600.
85. Id. at 605-06.
86. Id. at 605.
87. Id. at 605-06.
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holding: the decision recognized an unwritten, constitutional right,' and
it limited the power of the states to govern, violating his avowed
commitment to enhancing democratic decision making." Yet,
Rehnquist joined the majority opinion without reservation.'
The Court's development of a constitutional right of nondisclosure
of private information continued in Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, a case concerning President Nixon's multi-faceted challenge to
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which
ordered Nixon to turn over all presidential papers to the archivists so
that papers of public interest could be preserved and private papers be
returned to Nixon.91 Decided a few months after Whalen, the Nixon
majority again acknowledged a constitutional right to prevent
government disclosure of private information.9 However, the Court
again found no violation of that right, adopting a multi-factor balancing
test to conclude that Nixon's diminished privacy claim and the Act's
carefully constructed confidentiality provisions rendered the Act
constitutional .93
Rehnquist dissented, finding the Act unconstitutional on separation
of powers grounds.' In a lengthy footnote, Rehnquist chastised the
Court for failing to adequately protect the President's privacy interest.9
He argued that the Act's promise that papers lacking "general historical
significance" would be returned was so vague as to imperil Nixon's
individual privacy interest.96 In short, in both Whalen and Nixon,
88. See infra note 170 (discussing Rehnquist's opposition to the recognition of unwritten
rights). The majority argued that the right was not born in "the shadows cast by a variety of
provisions in the Bill of Rights," but rather was "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99 n.23.
89. See supra note 75 (discussing Rehnquist's commitment to narrowly construing
constitutional limitations on state power).
90. Rehnquist did not even join Justice Stewart's concurrence, which sought to address
these concerns by emphasizing that "there is no 'general constitutional "right to privacy.""'
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607-08 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Stewart argued that
protection of a person's right to be left alone was "left largely to the law of the individual
States." Id. at 608 (citation omitted).
91. 433 U.S. 425, 440 (1977). The Court also considered and rejected a number of other
challenges to the Act. Id. at 440-41.
92. Id. at 457.
93. Id. at 465.
94. Id. at 545-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 545 n.1.
96. Id. Rehnquist also argued that the executive privilege's protection of confidential
advice was based in part on concerns for privacy, and thus, even tapes and papers addressing
public affairs presented a "serious intrusion" upon privacy. Id.
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Rehnquist supported a claim of privacy against the government, a claim
that required the recognition of a new constitutional right and a claim
that limited the legislative freedom of both the states and the federal
government.
As the above journey through the case law has revealed, Rehnquist
valued privacy and sought to protect it by penalizing publication. He
urged the expansion of tort remedies, both in privacy and in libel, and
supported the creation of a constitutional limit on government
dissemination of private data. Both his votes and the language of his
opinions reflect a deep-seated belief in the value of a private life.
B. Protecting Privacy by Denying Access to Information
An alternative method of protecting privacy is to deny access,
keeping the information secret. As set out below, Rehnquist
consistently voted to close courtrooms, to block release of records on
privacy grounds under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and to
empower Congress and the states to keep private facts secret.
1. Protecting Privacy by Keeping the Press Out of the Courtroom and
Other Governmental Proceedings
When people appear in court or in other governmental proceedings,
their private lives are often exposed. From the first, Rehnquist
consistently and vocally opposed press claims of a First Amendment
right of access to governmental proceedings.7 He was one of the few
Justices to oppose the recognition of a press right of access to observe
criminal and civil trials.98
97. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S 368, 404 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) ("[T]here is no First Amendment right of access in the public or the press to
judicial or other governmental proceedings."); see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court
(Press-Enter. 11), 478 U.S. 1, 15-29 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting, in which Justice Rehnquist
joined); KPNX Broad. Co. v. Ariz. Superior Court, 459 U.S. 1302, 1308 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
as Circuit Justice, denying stay of trial court order on sketching of jurors); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 612-20 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, in which Justice
Rehnquist joined); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 604-06 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
Rehnquist has also voted against access rights to prisons. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974). Rehnquist's only pro-access vote, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
(Press-Enter. 1), 464 U.S. 501 (1984), is discussed in detail below. Rehnquist has, however,
held that if a proceeding is in fact open, the State cannot issue a prior restraint prohibiting
the reporting of what occurred. See, e.g., Okla. Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310
(1977); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
98. In Richmond, the Court had voted seven to one, over Rehnquist's lone dissent, to
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When his battle to close courtrooms was lost, he joined opinions
that, while recognizing a right of access, gave the lower courts the power
to close when necessary to protect privacy.' For instance, in Press
Enterprise I, Chief Justice Burger overturned a trial court's closure of
almost every day of a six-week jury voir dire,' but the opinion, which
Rehnquist joined, was full of concern for jury privacy. TM The Court
expressly held that the privacy interests of prospective jurors could be a
compelling interest that justified closure"° and emphasized that the trial
court should inform jurors of the right to answer sensitive questions in
private.' °3 Indeed, Burger's praise of juror privacy was so strong that
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence arguing that the Court
had not and should not recognize a distinct constitutional right of juror
privacy.' °4 Thus Rehnquist's only pro-access vote, one made after his
battle for no-access was already lost. was in a case where the opinion
recognized that the privacy rights of prospective jurors justified closure
under certain circumstances.'0 5
2. Protecting Privacy by Denying Access to Government Records
In his 1974 law review article on privacy, Rehnquist posited that one
of the greatest threats to privacy was the amount of information that the
government, in the era of the welfare state, had gathered about its
recognize a right of access to criminal trials. 448 U.S. at 558. The missing Justice, Justice
Powell, recused, id. at 581, but had previously signaled his willingness to recognize such a
First Amendment right, see Gannett, 443 U.S. at 397-403, leaving Rehnquist as the lone vote
against any access right.
99. Press-Enter. 1, 464 U.S. at 502, 511-13; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 618-20
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
100. Press-Enter. 1, 464 U.S. at 503-05.
101. See generally id. at 503-13.
102. Id. at 511-12.
103. Id. at 512. The Court cautioned the trial courts to only release a transcript "if the
judge determine[d] that disclosure can be accomplished while safeguarding the juror's valid
privacy interests." Id.
104. Id. at 513-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105. Rehnquist's support for privacy was also on display in the only other court access
case to address privacy, Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, where the majority struck down
a Massachusetts statute that mandated closure during the testimony of minor victims of
sexual assault. 457 U.S. 596, 610-11. The majority agreed that the state's interest in
protecting the minor victims of sex crimes was compelling, but found that a mandatory
closure rule, requiring closure in all cases without any finding of need, was unconstitutional.
id. at 602, 607-09. In dissent, Burger (joined by Rehnquist) argued that it was error to limit
the states' ability to protect minor victims of sexual assault. Id. at 612-13 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Burger's dissent included a lengthy footnote recognizing the privacy rights of the
child rape victims. Id. at 612 n.1.
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citizens: "the government will know more about each of us than it did 50
years ago and ... in a very real sense we will have that much less
privacy.'' Faced with requests for access to information held by the
government, Rehnquist consistently refused release and joined opinions
that adopted wide privacy protections.
The FOIA requires the federal government to release information to
the public, unless the information falls within one of the exemptions set
out in the Act. °7 Two such exemptions concern privacy: § 552(b)(6)
exempts "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy,"" and § 552(b)(7) exempts "law enforcement" records where
disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. ' 9
Rejecting any "cramped notion" of privacy, "' the Rehnquist Court
repeatedly took an expansive view of these exemptions."' Most notably,
the Court openly adopted a definition of privacy under the FOIA that
was broader than the right to privacy recognized by common law or the
Constitution. 2  Equating privacy with the right to "control...
information concerning his or her person,"' 13 the Court applied the
privacy exemption not just to confidential information, but also to
information already made public, even information contained in other
public records."' Indeed, the Rehnquist Court once boasted that "none
106. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 15.
107. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. II 2002 & Supp. III 2003 & Supp. IV 2004 & Supp.
V 2005); Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160 (2004).
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000).
109. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
110. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
763 (1989).
111. Favish, 541 U.S. at 160; Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 355-56
(1997); U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487,502 (1994); U.S. Dep't
of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
at 763; FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982); U.S. Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456
U.S. 595, 598 (1982); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380-81 (1976). In addition
to the broad definition of privacy discussed in the text, the Court also widely defined the type
of record the exemptions apply to, see, e.g, Abramson, 456 U.S. at 621; Wash. Post Co., 456
U.S. at 598; Rose, 425 U.S. at 376-77, allowed family members to assert a privacy interest, see
Favish, 541 U.S. at 170-71, and required a heightened showing in privacy cases, see, e.g.,
Favish, 541 U.S. at 160; Martin E. Halstuk, When Is an Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted
Under the FOIA? An Analysis of the Supreme Court's "Sufficient Reason" and "Presumption
of Legitimacy" Standards, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 361 (2005).
112. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 762 n.13.
113. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 762-65. Thus, the Court has found privacy interests in rap sheets (even if
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of our cases construing the FOIA" have upheld "a FOIA request for
information about a particular private citizen.
' 15
Rehnquist has been a strong supporter of this trend. He voted
against the release of records and for a broad reading of privacy in every
FOIA case before the Court during his tenure.11 6 Of note is his dissent
in Rose' 7 where the Court considered a FOIA request by law review
editors for summaries of honor code hearings at the Air Force
Academy."" The majority held that the case summaries could be
produced if, after an in camera inspection, the trial court concluded that
the redaction of the names of the participants would be "sufficient to
safeguard privacy.""'9 Yet, in the eyes of the three dissenters, Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, any release, even
after in camera redaction, violated the privacy objectives of the
exemption"2
Rehnquist's influence, if not his voice, can also be felt in the Court's
key case in this area, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press."'
In an opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the
release of FBI rap sheets would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
the personal privacy of the suspect.' 2  Justice Stevens's opinion for a
unanimous Court was replete with praise for privacy, including citation
to Rehnquist's Rose dissent1 13 and his University of Kansas Law Review
article. 124 The case also echoed Rehnquist's concern that absent a broad
compiled from other public records), home addresses, and such basic information as dates
and places of birth. See id. at 762, 775 (rap sheets); Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at
502 (home addresses); Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 600-01 (passport applications).
115. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 774-75.
116. Favish, 541 U.S. at 175; Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355-56; Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510
U.S. at 502; Ray, 502 U.S. at 179; Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 774-
75; Abramson, 456 U.S. at 621; Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 601; Rose, 425 U.S. at 389
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He wrote twice, in two of the Court's early decisions: first in
dissent in Rose, 425 U.S. at 389, and then, for the Court, in Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595.
117. 425 U.S. at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 354-55 (opinion of the Court).
119. Id. at 381 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The Court was highly
protective of privacy, concluding that there was a valid privacy claim, which could not be
"rejected as trivial," even though the original summaries had been posted by the Air Force
and even though the request was only for records with names redacted. Id. at 380-81.
120. Rose, 425 U.S. at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 382-85 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 388-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rehnquist's dissent sought to distinguish
his ruling in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), discussed infra in Part II.C.
121. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
122. Id. at 762-63.
123. Id. at 769.
124. Id. at 770-71.
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exception for privacy, the vast amount of information on private
individuals collected by the many arms of the federal government would
become open to public inspection "transform[ing]" the federal
government "in one fell swoop into the clearinghouse for highly
personal information, releasing records on any person, to any requester,
for any purpose."'
' 5
In sum, faced with FOIA requests, Rehnquist consistently refused
release and joined opinions that crafted wide privacy exceptions
reflecting his long-held concerns about government databases.
3. Protecting Privacy by Upholding Statutes That Keep Information
Secret
Rehnquist has been equally supportive of government efforts to
deny access to government records, thus, de facto, protecting privacy.
For instance, in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting
Publishing Corp.,'26 Rehnquist rejected a First Amendment challenge to
California's refusal to release arrest records. 27  While the opinion
focused on the validity of a facial (versus an "as applied") challenge,28
Rehnquist went out of his way to note that not only did California's
current limit on access to arrest records pass muster, but that "California
could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating
the First Amendment."'2 9 This proposition, which drew the agreement
of the entire Court,3 ° reflected Rehnquist's belief that governments are
free to deny access to information in their possession, especially
information that infringes on privacy. 3'
Rehnquist's willingness to uphold statutes that limit access to private
information was illustrated again in the 2000 case of Reno v. Condon.
32
125. Id. at 761 (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 831 F.2d 1124, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting)). The Court saw this threat
compounded by the advent of computerized databases: information that would once have
been forgotten would now be stored and potentially released, increasing the threat to
personal privacy. Id. at 771.
126. 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
127. Id. at 37.
128. Id. at 37-40.
129. Id. at 40.
130. See id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the proposition, but dissenting in the judgment).
131. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, focusing as it does on facial challenges, does not
address privacy, but as Justice Stevens's dissent notes, the state's only asserted interest in
limiting access to arrest records is to protect privacy. Id. at 46.
132. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
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The federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act restricted the ability of
states to disclose a driver's personal information.133 Most states required
citizens applying for driving licenses to disclose extensive personal
information' 34 and then resold this information for millions of dollars.
3 5
The federal Act, however, barred state disclosure of the personal
information absent the driver's express consent. 6 The federal Act was
challenged by the State of South Carolina on two federalism grounds:
that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause and that
the restrictions on the State violated the Tenth Amendment by
requiring states, in their sovereign capacity, to regulate their own
citizens. 37 Rehnquist, the father of federalism, writing for a unanimous
Court, rejected both challenges and upheld Congress's efforts to protect
privacy.' While his opinion sought to reconcile his holding with prior
federalism cases,' one explanation of his temporary betrayal of
federalism is that the statute promoted the informational privacy of
almost every citizen, a value Rehnquist held dear, although one he
never mentioned in his opinion. Read together, the lesson of Los
Angeles and Reno is that states may deny access to private information,
and if the states fail to protect this privacy, Congress may step in and fill
the void.
One final group of cases shows Rehnquist's support of state efforts
to protect privacy by limiting access-the anonymous speaker cases.
Fairly consistently in his years on the Court, Rehnquist rejected claims
that the First Amendment encompassed a right to speak anonymously.'
4°
In McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission,"4' he joined Justice Scalia's
dissent refusing to invalidate a statute that barred the distribution of
133. Id. at 143.
134. Id. The information typically included name, address, telephone number, vehicle
description, social security number, medical background, and photograph. Id.
135. Id. at 143-44.
136. Id. at 144-45. There were also a series of statutory exceptions. Id.
137. Id. at 147-51.
138. Id. at 151.
139. Id. at 148-49.
140. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 172-80
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 371-
85 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 75-76
(1974) (rejecting, as failing to present a concrete controversy, privacy claims based on
reporting requirements of new banking regulations). The one exception is Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, where Rehnquist apparently conceded the
precedential authority of McIntyre. 525 U.S. 182, 232 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
141. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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anonymous campaign literature,142 and in Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society v. Village of Stratton,43 he was the lone dissenter who would
have upheld a village ordinance requiring all canvassers to register prior
to going door-to-door.' Rehnquist, in his Watchtower dissent, argued
that the state should have been permitted to limit canvassers and protect
the privacy of the village home owners. 45  Their privacy was a
"significant' ' 16 and "important' ' 47 governmental interest: The "home is
one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself up in his own
ideas if he desires.' 418  In Rehnquist's eye, because the ordinance
enhanced privacy by ensuring "fewer uninvited knocks," it was
constitutional.1' 9  Thus, Rehnquist, once again, sought to protect a
private life.
C. Limitations, Contradictions, and Explanations
The above sections evidence that Rehnquist wrote and voted in
favor of informational privacy throughout his time on the Court. He
sought to give remedies to those whose privacy was invaded as well as to
block access to private information. But it is not the thesis of this
Article that Rehnquist viewed informational privacy as an absolute.
Rather, as he did in so many other areas, Rehnquist advocated that
privacy be balanced against competing interests: as he put it in his 1974
article, "privacy is a value that competes with other values."'5 ° The prior
142. Id. at 371-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
144. Id. at 172, 180 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 172-80. Neither the majority nor Rehnquist in dissent focused on the
potential privacy claim of the speaker. The majority did acknowledge that the speaker who
seeks anonymity may be motivated by the "desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as
possible," id. at 166 (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42); nevertheless, the Court has
viewed the right to canvas anonymously not as a part of privacy, but rather as "an aspect of
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
146. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 176 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 178.
148. Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 178. Rehnquist also extolled the privacy of the home in his dissent in Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478-79 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist's dissent both
emphasized the importance of protecting the privacy of the home, id. at 478-79, and, quoting
Justice Frankfurter, urged the Court that "it is not for us to supervise the limits the legislature
may impose in safeguarding the steadily narrowing opportunities for serenity and reflection."
Id. at 489 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
150. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 2. He continued:
Increased privacy of the individual may mean less effective enforcement
of the laws or a less well-informed citizenry. Recognizing that claims for
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sections reveal that privacy prevailed in this balancing with surprising
frequency. This section attempts to explain how privacy faired when it
competed with some of Rehnquist's other core values.
1. Privacy Versus Effective Law Enforcement
In Rehnquist's hierarchy of values, privacy never trumped the state's
interest in effective law enforcement."' In his 1974 article, while
Rehnquist admitted that the Fourth Amendment protects a "very strong
core-area" of privacy, he insisted that such privacy must be balanced
against the "even stronger societal interest in permitting police ... to
apprehend and convict a criminal.', 5 2  His record on the Court was
consistent with this philosophy: he repeatedly rejected privacy claims by
accused, showing less concern for the protection of Fourth Amendment
privacy rights than any of his contemporaries on the Court.'53 Under
Rehnquist's philosophy, criminals or even suspected criminals did not
have privacy rights that could outweigh the needs of "effective law
enforcement. "'14
increased privacy might produce these results does not by any means
suggest that the claims should be rejected, but it does suggest that they
should be carefully analyzed not only in terms of the values they would
advance, but in terms of the values they would displace.
Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).
151. Bradley, supra note 9, at 93-94 (summarizing Rehnquist's record in Fourth
Amendment cases).
152. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 14 (emphasis added).
153. Bradley, supra note 9, at 93-94 (summarizing Rehnquist's record in Fourth
Amendment cases).
154. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 21. Some authors have suggested that Rehnquist's
position in Fourth Amendment cases was driven, in part, by a lack of empathy with accused.
See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 9, at 103 (reviewing Rehnquist's record and suggesting that "[t]o
the extent that personal feelings and experiences underlie a Justice's attitudes about the law,
the prospect of being stopped or searched by police would not seem to be a personal concern
of Rehnquist's. Nor does he empathize with those people for whom it is a more realistic
possibility."). However, the privacy cases show that, while Rehnquist opposed any privacy
rights that would interfere with police work, he was willing to protect the privacy interests of
accused and criminals when doing so did not conflict with law enforcement goals. See also
Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 8 (acknowledging that individuals have some privacy interest in
their arrest records). Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (holding there was no
privacy claim against police for the release of an arrest record as part of crime prevention
efforts), with U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 766-67 (1989) (holding that individuals have a privacy interest in their rap sheets, which
will support the government's decision not to disclose under the FOIA), Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107-08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (holding that the state may protect
the anonymity of juvenile accused), and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 168-
69 (1979) (suggesting that participation in criminal conduct was not sufficient to lose private
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This "trump card" effect of law enforcement may explain Justice
Rehnquist's early opinion in Paul.55 The facts of Paul were relatively
simple: the plaintiff was arrested for shoplifting, was arraigned and pled
not guilty, and later the charge was dismissed. 56 After the arrest and
arraignment, but prior to the dismissal, two police departments
distributed a flyer alerting store owners to possible shoplifters who
might be active during the holiday season.57 The flyer included the
plaintiff's mug shot and labeled him as an "active shoplifter[]."'58
Plaintiff filed a § 1983 action against the police chiefs alleging that
the flyer deprived him of his "liberty" in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 Writing for the Court, Rehnquist rejected the plaintiff's
constitutional claim, holding that reputational harm, by itself, is
insufficient to trigger the constitutional protections of the due process
clause.'6 However, the complaint also asserted a constitutional privacy
claim, 6' and in a brief section at the end of his opinion, Rehnquist
rejected this claim too.'62
Rehnquist noted that there was "no 'right of privacy' found in any
specific guarantee of the Constitution,' 63 but admitted, citing to the
Court's recent decision in Roe v. Wade,'6 that the Court had
"recognized that 'zones of privacy' may be created by more specific
constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government
power.' ' 65 Rehnquist, however, found that the plaintiff's privacy claim
figure status). Thus, Rehnquist's record should not be read as simply an antipathy to
criminals. He was willing to protect the privacy interests of criminals; what he adamantly
resisted was any claim to privacy that conflicted with the state's law enforcement efforts.
155. 424 U.S. at 694.
156. Id. at 695-96.
157. Id. at 694-95. The flyer stated that those pictured, including the plaintiff, had been
"arrested during 1971 and 1972 or ha[d] been active in various criminal fields in high density
shopping areas." Id. at 695.
158. Id. at 695.
159. Id. at 697.
160. Id. at 694, 712. Most of Rehnquist's opinion sought to distinguish prior cases. Id. at
701-12. Rehnquist also argued that, as a matter of policy, the Fourteenth Amendment should
not be read in a way that transformed it into "a font of tort law." Id. at 701.
161. Id. at 712.
162. Id. at 712-14. The privacy issue was not ruled on by the court of appeals, id. at 712,
nor was there "substantial" briefing or argument on the issue to the Supreme Court, id. at 735
n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 712.
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. Paul, 424 U.S. at 712-13.
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came "within none of these areas"' 66 because it triggered neither the
zone of privacy relating to marriage and procreation recognized by Roe
v. Wade, nor the protections against search and seizure spelled out in the
Fourth Amendment. 167  According to Rehnquist, "[n]one of [the
Court's] substantive privacy decisions" covered the release by the state
of a "record of an official act such as an arrest."'16 Thus, in Paul,
Rehnquist refused to recognize a constitutional right to informational
privacy, closing the door on what Justice Brennan, in dissent, reported
to be a growing set of lower court decisions recognizing a "substantive
limit[] on the power of the government to disseminate unresolved arrest
records outside the law enforcement system. ' '"69
The simplest explanation170 of Rehnquist's decision in Paul is that the
166. Id. at 713.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 735 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. There are two other possible explanations for Rehnquist's vote in Paul that I do not
find as convincing as those canvassed in the text, but they should be mentioned. First, it is
possible that Rehnquist thought arrest records were public records, and thus, there was no
privacy interest. Indeed, Rehnquist specifically described the arrest record at issue in Paul as
"a record of an official act." Id. at 713.
However, such a theory is contradicted by Rehnquist's writings and opinions, which
consistently recognized a limited privacy interest in records of official conduct. In his 1974
article on privacy, Rehnquist concluded that even though an "arrest is not a 'private' event"
and is "ordinarily a matter of public record," an individual did have an "interest in limiting
disclosure or dissemination of the information." Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 8. Rehnquist's
record in the other privacy cases also reflected a belief that a claim of privacy could be made
for records that report government acts. It is true that in the private fact cases Rehnquist
held that once the state officially released a record, for instance in open court, it could not
then punish publication by the press. See Okla. Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308,
310-12 (1977). However, Rehnquist never held that, just because records detailed official
acts or reported previously public facts, there was no privacy interest. To the contrary, in the
FOIA cases he repeatedly argued that there was a privacy interest in preventing the release of
official records of wrongdoing, even if they had been previously public. See U.S. Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764-65 (1989)
(recognizing a privacy interest in a rap sheet compiled by the FBI from public records); Dep't
of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 389-90 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (recognizing
a privacy interest in previously posted reports of honor code hearings); see also Nixon v.
Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 545 n.1 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Nixon retained a privacy interest in the records of his actions as President). Equally,
Rehnquist held there was a strong state interest in protecting the anonymity of juveniles
accused, even though the states only reported official action. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Because Rehnquist consistently
recognized some kind of privacy interest, even in records that report official government acts,
it is unlikely that this explains his vote in Paul.
A second possible explanation is that the Paul case is collateral damage in Rehnquist's
war against the recognition of unwritten constitutional rights in general and Roe v. Wade in
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privacy claims by accused always yield to the needs of effective law
enforcement. Indeed, in his 1974 article on privacy, Rehnquist had
discussed various privacy claims that might arise when law enforcement
released arrest records.' While acknowledging that an individual has
some "interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the
information,"'7'  Rehnquist concluded that such claims must fail when
balanced against the needs of law enforcement.'73 After all, arrest
records, while not "conclusive evidence of wrongdoing," did indicate
"probable cause to arrest" and were an important tool in police work.'74
Rehnquist's vote in Paul reaffirmed that privacy claims never trumped
society's interest in effective law enforcement.
2. Does Privacy Ever Limit Government Action?
The more fundamental question is whether Rehnquist was ever
willing to protect privacy if it meant imposing limitations on the
government's freedom to act. Overall, Rehnquist's constitutional
philosophy was marked by an unwillingness to limit the power of
particular. By 1976, the year Paul was decided, his opposition to the judicial creation of
constitutional rights was a matter of public record. In his now famous address, William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976), Rehnquist
warned against judges who would engraft on to the Constitution "some other set of values for
those which may be derived from the language and intent of the framers," id. at 695. Touting
himself as a strict constructionist, id. at 705, and having already taken the position that Roe v.
Wade lacked any sound constitutional basis, Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 4-5, Rehnquist may
have been hesitant to support any expansion of a privacy right founded in the penumbra of
the Constitution. It would seem harder to criticize Roe v. Wade's substantive privacy right, if
he relied on it and expanded it in Paul. Therefore, Rehnquist's vote in Paul may reflect a
discomfort with supporting, even by inference, Roe v. Wade's unwritten right of privacy. But,
while Rehnquist's opposition to the privacy claims asserted in Paul may have been fueled in
part by his discomfort with condoning the unwritten right of privacy recognized in Roe v.
Wade, it cannot provide a complete explanation of his vote in Paul because Rehnquist's
record suggests that he was comfortable with recognizing some forms of privacy while
condemning others. In his own article, in 1974, he advocated unraveling privacy, recognizing
privacy in some contexts but not others. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 21. His opinion in
Casey shows the same approach: the acceptance of some and rejection of other substantive
privacy rights. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). He also, as
discussed in Part II.A.2, condoned the creation of an unwritten privacy right to limit
government disclosure of information in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), and Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). See supra Part II.A.2.
171. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 6-12. Rehnquist even expressly discussed one of the
court of appeals decisions cited by Brennan in dissent in Paul. Id. at 6-8 (discussing Menard
v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id. at 10.
174. Id.
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democratically elected governments to make policy decisions.' 75  He
opposed the judicial expansion of individual rights, especially those not
spelled out in the Constitution.76 Such expansion both limited states'
rights and smacked of judicial activism, rather than the strict
constructionism Rehnquist had sworn to uphold.
7
Most of the time, Rehnquist could protect privacy while also
remaining true to these other goals. It is unsurprising that Rehnquist
protected privacy when his love of privacy coincided with his desire to
enhance state freedom and to resist the expansion of individual rights.
Thus, in private fact and libel cases, Rehnquist could protect privacy by
upholding the power of the state to provide tort remedies in the face of
novel First Amendment challenges.7 7 Likewise, in the access cases
(whether denying access to courts, blocking requests for records under
the FOIA, or empowering Congress and the states to limit access),
Rehnquist could vote for privacy while also limiting individual rights
and empowering the government to act.
79
One specter, raised by Rehnquist's decision in Paul, is that perhaps
privacy never acted as a limit on government,' 8° and if so, Rehnquist's
privacy right was weak indeed. There is some support for such a
reading: in his dissent in Rose, the FOIA case, Rehnquist seemed to
draw a sharp distinction between cases like Paul where the government
"chose to disseminate" records-and privacy claims failed-and cases
like Rose where the government had "chosen not to disseminate the
records"-and privacy claims succeeded."8' Privacy, he implied, only
worked to support government decisions, never to second guess them.'"
175. See supra note 74.
176. See supra note 170 (discussing Rehnquist as a strict constructionist).
177. Id.
178. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of these cases.
179. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of these cases.
180. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
181. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 389-90 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In Rose, Rehnquist dissented from the Court's release of redacted reports of Air
Force honor code hearings requested under the FOIA. Id. Rehnquist argued that releasing
the hearing reports failed to protect the privacy of the cadets. Id. Paul and Rose are
strikingly similar in one way: both concerned disclosure of government records of past
misdeeds. Paul, 424 U.S. at 712 (an arrest record); Rose, 425 U.S. at 354-55 (honor code
reports).
182. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist's full
explanation was:
Although this case requires our consideration of a claim of a right to
"privacy," it arises in quite a different context from some of our other
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However, two cases, Whalen' 3 and Nixon,'84 suggest that Rehnquist's
support for privacy was more robust. Whalen was the challenge to the
state's creation of a computer database of prescriptions,'85 and Nixon
addressed the federal government's right to seize and archive Nixon's
presidential records. 86 Whalen and Nixon were both decided in 1977,
and both recognized that there was a constitutional right to privacy of
information and that this right limited the action of government.'87
Rehnquist's pro-privacy vote in these cases is notable for two
reasons. First, the cases seemingly read a novel right of privacy into the
Constitution, and Rehnquist, as a strict constructionist, was openly
critical of judicially created rights.' Second, the right to nondisclosure,
recognized in Whalen and Nixon, limited the actions of government, and
indeed, imposed liability on government, if privacy rights were
violated. 9 While neither Whalen nor Nixon found any unjustified
disclosure, '90 their holdings have spawned a series of cases imposing
liability on government for wrongful disclosure of private information,
particularly about governmental employees.'9'
recent decisions such as Paul v. Davis. In that case custodians of public
records chose to disseminate them, and one of the subjects of the record
claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibited the custodian from doing so. Here the custodian
of the records, petitioner Department of the Air Force, has chosen not to
disseminate the records, and its decision to that effect is being challenged
by a citizen under the Freedom of Information Act.
Id. at 389 (citation omitted).
183. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of this
case.
184. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). See supra Part II.A.2 for a
discussion of this case.
185. 429 U.S. at 591-95.
186. 433 U.S. at 430-36.
187. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457. Both were decided within
a year of Paul, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In both Whalen and Nixon, Rehnquist supported the
privacy right: in Whalen he joined the majority opinion, 429 U.S. at 590, and in Nixon he
dissented, in part because the majority failed to protect Nixon's privacy, 433 U.S. at 545 n.1.
188. See supra note 170 (discussing Rehnquist as a strict constructionist).
189. In Whalen, the Court found no evidence that the state had disclosed the
information in its drug database. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06. In Nixon, the majority also
held that there was no constitutional violation after performing a multi-faceted balancing test.
433 U.S. at 465. Rehnquist dissented in Nixon. Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). While
most of his opinion focused on separation of powers issues, Rehnquist argued, in an extensive
footnote, that the majority was too quick to reject Nixon's privacy claim. Id. at 545 n.1.
190. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457 (majority opinion).
191. See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Whalen and Nixon suggest that when informational privacy was
aligned against two of Rehnquist's core values-his unwillingness to
create constitutional rights and his unwillingness to limit state activity-
privacy could still win. Privacy lost out in Paul only because of the
strong law enforcement goals that were also aligned against privacy.'"
That privacy could win out when arrayed against strict constructionism
and states' rights demonstrates that for Rehnquist, while informational
privacy was not absolute, it was a core value.
III. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: FRIEND OR FOE?
Predicting the future votes of a Justice can be difficult at best, but in
Chief Justice Roberts's case, the task is made harder by his relatively
short tenure on the bench.'93 Yet, recent studies have shown that, at
least for the first decade of service, Justices stray little from the ideology
they hold upon joining the bench.'94 Thus, it seems valid to ask, even at
this early stage, whether Roberts is a supporter of informational privacy.
Roberts has not decided any private fact tort cases, but his vote in
the libel case of Lohrenz v. Donnelly suggests an approach at odds with
Rehnquist's.' 9' In Lohrenz, Roberts joined an opinion for the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, holding that one of the first female Navy
fighter pilots was a public, not a private, figure.'9 The Lohrenz panel
ruled that a private person could become a public figure, even if she did
192. Ironically, there are echoes of law enforcement interests in both Whalen and Nixon.
In Whalen, the state created the drug prescription database as part of its efforts to control
drugs being diverted into illegal channels, 429 U.S. at 597-98, and in Nixon, Congress's
passage of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act was motivated by the
belief that perhaps Nixon was a crook, or at least could not be trusted with the records of his
presidency, 433 U.S. at 430-36. However, neither case raised any possibility that the privacy
claim would impede law enforcement efforts. In Whalen, the New York statute prohibited
the disclosure of prescription information to the public but allowed its use by state
investigators. 429 U.S. at 594-95. Indeed, the very purpose of the statute was to aid the
detection and prosecution of illegal drug usage. Id. at 591-92. Equally, in Nixon, the records
at issue had already been made available to the special prosecutor, 433 U.S. at 430-31, and
the issue before the Court was simply their disclosure to the archivist. Id. at 465. Thus,
neither case presented the same threat to effective law enforcement posed by PauL
193. Roberts has served on the bench for almost four years. He served on the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from June 2003 until his elevation to Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court in September 2005.
194. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When,
and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483, 1521 (2007) (concluding that while Justices
adhered to contemporaneous expectations "at least during the Justice's first term in office,"
thereafter Justices grew more liberal or conservative during their tenure on the Court).
195. 350 F.3d 1272, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
196. Id.
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not actively seek publicity."9 "[A]chiev[ing] a 'special prominence' in
the debate," even though such prominence was not affirmatively sought,
was enough to trigger public figure status."' This approach contradicts
that advocated by Rehnquist who, by requiring a showing that the
person voluntarily sought publicity, greatly expanded who qualified as a
private figure.' 99 Thus, what little evidence we have shows that Roberts
is no clone of Rehnquist in the libel or private facts arena.
Roberts's record also provides no evidence of a sensitivity to the
privacy threat posed by government databases. Roberts has not decided
any cases concerning claims, under Whalen or Nixon, that the
government's compilation and release of information violated a citizen's
right to nondisclosure of private information. However, his support for
national identity cards while working in the Reagan White House
indicates little concern with government gathering and control of data.2"
While Roberts asserted that he would "yield to no one in the area of
commitment to individual liberty against the spectre of overreaching
central authority," in his view, concerns about a national I.D. card were
"largely symbolic."20' For Roberts, immigration was a "real threat" that
easily outweighed the "symbolic" dangers posed by the introduction of a
mandatory national identification system 2 Roberts's assessment stands
in stark contrast to Rehnquist's, who saw government compilation of
data as causing, "in a very real sense," a loss of privacy.
Roberts's record of protecting privacy by denying access to
government records and meetings is mixed. Roberts, unlike Rehnquist,
seems to presume that courts must operate in the open. During his
confirmation hearing, in response to questions about the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court, which operates in secret,
Roberts opined that while there were reasons that justified closure for
the FISA Court, such closure was a "departure[] from the normal
judicial model." 20 On the court of appeals, Roberts also participated in
197. Id. at 1280-81. The panel held that the plaintiff assumed the risk of becoming a
public figure by choosing combat aviation. Id.
198. Id. at 1279 (citation omitted).
199. See supra Part II.A.L.b (discussing Rehnquist's approach in libel cases).
200. See Letter from Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 11, at 7.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 15.
204. Hearing, supra note 1, at 213 (responding to questions from Senator DeWine).
However, in response to other questions he did not seem to have a firm grasp, let alone a
strong view, on a right of access to government institutions. Id. at 303-09.
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two cases on access to governmental records, one that granted access
and the other denying it. In Tax Analysts v. IRS, Chief Justice Roberts
joined a unanimous panel to hold that the Tax Reform Act did require
the IRS to disclose redacted documentation supporting its denial or
revocation of tax-exempt status, concluding that Congress's aim was "to
protect taxpayer privacy while requiring the IRS to disclose written
determinations." 205 In contrast, in In re Cheney, Chief Justice Roberts
joined the unanimous en banc opinion of the court of appeals in holding
that the Federal Advisory Committee Act did not grant access to the
documents or meetings of President Bush's National Energy Policy
Development Group.2" These cases, Tax Analysts and In re Cheney,
focused on questions of separation of powers and of statutory
interpretation, and give us little sense of where Roberts stands on access
to private information.0 7
By far the largest body of cases that give an inkling of Roberts's
views on privacy are in the Fourth Amendment area. Roberts, like
Rehnquist, frequently rejects claims under the Fourth Amendment2 8
Of most interest is Roberts's opinion for a unanimous panel of the D.C.
Circuit in Stewart v. Evans, where a government employee claimed her
Fourth Amendment rights were violated after government lawyers
reviewed documents relating to a gender discrimination charge she had
filed against the then Inspector General2 9 While the employee agreed
to allow a review of her documents to see if they were called for by a
newspaper's FOIA request, she only shared the records on the express
condition that the records not be shown to the lawyers defending against
her discrimination charge-a condition the government promptly
violated.210 Roberts held that as soon as she handed over the documents
in response to the FOIA claim, she lost all privacy interest in them:
205. 350 F.3d 100, 104 (2003).
206. 406 F.3d 723, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court found that because the President
chose to "form a committee composed only of federal employees," the committee was
"exempt from FACA." Id. at 728. The court acknowledged that its ruling enabled the
President to "create an advisory body whose internal communications will remain
confidential." Id.
207. Roberts did decide a lot of FOIA cases while serving on the D.C. Circuit, but none
concerned the privacy exemptions.
208. See, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (2007); United States
v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, Cir. J., dissenting); United States v.
Lawson, 410 F.3d 735, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
386 F.3d 1148, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786, 792 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
209. Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
210. Id. at 1240-42.
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"The reason Stewart transferred the documents is highly pertinent....
When the threat of mandatory disclosure accompanies the transfer of
documents to a third party, little reasonable expectation of privacy
exists., 21 '  For Roberts, while the "Fourth Amendment protects
privacy[,] it does not constitutionalize non-disclosure agreements. 21 2
Roberts's opinion seems to take a parsimonious view of privacy, but it
may simply reflect a general hostility to Fourth Amendment claims, a
philosophy that Rehnquist shared.
This, then, is Roberts's record on informational privacy. It is
perhaps too early to say that Chief Justice Roberts will prove a foe to
informational privacy. However, his record so far gives no indication of
any concern for privacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Rehnquist once wrote that "no thinking person is
categorically opposed to 'privacy' in the abstract., 21 '3 As this Article
reveals, Rehnquist valued privacy not only in the abstract, but also,
repeatedly, in his decisions on the bench. In contrast, while Roberts
may resemble his mentor in many ways, his record suggests that he will
not fill Rehnquist's shoes as the Court's champion for privacy of
information.
211. Id. at 1244.
212. Id.
213. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 2.
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